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Abstract
We study the parameterized complexity of the optimal defense and optimal attack problems in voting.
In both the problems, the input is a set of voter groups (every voter group is a set of votes) and two
integers ka and kd corresponding to respectively the number of voter groups the attacker can attack
and the number of voter groups the defender can defend. A voter group gets removed from the election
if it is attacked but not defended. In the optimal defense problem, we want to know if it is possible for
the defender to commit to a strategy of defending at most kd voter groups such that, no matter which
ka voter groups the attacker attacks, the outcome of the election does not change. In the optimal
attack problem, we want to know if it is possible for the attacker to commit to a strategy of attacking
ka voter groups such that, no matter which kd voter groups the defender defends, the outcome of
the election is always different from the original (without any attack) one. We show that both the
optimal defense problem and the optimal attack problem are computationally intractable for every
scoring rule and the Condorcet voting rule even when we have only 3 candidates. We also show that
the optimal defense problem for every scoring rule and the Condorcet voting rule is W[2]-hard for both
the parameters ka and kd, while it admits a fixed parameter tractable algorithm parameterized by the
combined parameter (ka,kd). The optimal attack problem for every scoring rule and the Condorcet
voting rule turns out to be much harder – it is W[1]-hard even for the combined parameter (ka,kd).
We propose two greedy algorithms for the OPTIMAL DEFENSE problem and empirically show that they
perform effectively on reasonable voting profiles.
Keywords and phrases parameterized complexity, election control, optimal attack, optimal defense
1 Introduction
The problem of election control asks if it is possible for an external agent, usually with a
fixed set of resources, to influence the outcome of the election by altering its structure in
some limited way. There are several specific manifestations of this problem: for instance,
one may ask if it is possible to change the winner by deleting k voter groups, presumably
by destroying ballot boxes or rigging electronically submitted votes. Indeed, several cases
of violence at the ballot boxes have been placed on record [7, 2], and in 2010, Halderman
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and his students exposed serious vulnerabilities in the electronic voting systems that are
in widespread use in several states [1]. A substantial amount of the debates around the
recently concluded presidential elections in the United States revolved around issues of
potential fraud, with people voting multiple times, stuffing ballot boxes, etc. all of which
are well recognized forms of election control. For example, Wolchok et al. [54] studied
security aspects on Internet voting systems.
Parameters
OPTIMAL DEFENSE OPTIMAL ATTACK
Scoring rules Condorcet Scoring rules Condorcet
kd W[2]-hard [Theorem 15] W[2]-hard [Theorem 18] W[2]-hard [Theorem 16] W[2]-hard [Theorem 19]
ka W[2]-hard [Theorem 22] W[2]-hard [Theorem 23]
W[1]-hard [Theorem 25] W[1]-hard [Theorem 26]
(ka,kd)
O∗(k
kd
a ) [Theorem 28]
No poly kernel [Theorem 27]
m para-NP-hard [Theorem 13] para-coNP-hard [Theorem 13]
Table 1 Summary of parameterized complexity results. kd : the maximum number of voter groups
that the defender can defend. ka : the maximum number of voter groups that the attacker can attack.
m : the number of candidates.
The study of controlling elections is fundamental to computational social choice: it is widely
studied from a theoretical perspective, and has deep practical impact. Bartholdi et al [4]
initiated the study of these problems from a computational perspective, hoping that compu-
tational hardness of these problems may suggest a substantial barrier to the phenomena of
control: if it is, say NP-hard to control an election, then the manipulative agent may not
be able to compute an optimal control strategy in a reasonable amount of time. This basic
approach has been intensely studied in various other scenarios. For instance, Faliszewski
et al. [27] studied the problem of control where different types of attacks are combined
(multimode control), Mattei et al [44] showed hardness of a variant of control which just
exercises different tie-breaking rules, Bulteau et al. [10] studied voter control in a combin-
atorial setting, etc [49, 52, 28, 11, 43, 31, 30, 29, 26, 45, 25, 24, 24, 34, 37, 33, 36, 32, 47,
48, 51, 14, 21, 20, 16, 17, 15].
Exploring parameterized complexity of various control problems has also gained a lot of
interest. For example, Betzler and Uhlmann [6] studied parameterized complexity of can-
didate control in elections and showed interesting connection with digraph problems, Liu
and Zhu [41, 42] studied parameterized complexity of control problem by deleting voters
for many common voting rules, and so on [40, 53, 38, 18, 22]. Studying election control
from a game theoretic approach using security games is also an active area of research. See,
for example, the works of An et al. and Letchford et al. [3, 39].
The broad theme of using computational hardness as a barrier to control has two distinct lim-
itations: one is, of course, that some voting rules simply remain computationally vulnerable
to many forms of control, in the sense that optimal strategies can be found in polynomial
time. The other is that even NP-hard control problems often admit reasonable heuristics,
can be approximated well, or even admit efficient exact algorithms in realistic scenarios.
Therefore, relying on NP-hardness alone is arguably not a robust strategy against control.
To address this issue, the work of Yin et al. [56] explicitly defined the problem of protect-
ing an election from control, where in addition to the manipulative agent, we also have a
“defender”, who can also deploy some resources to spoil a planned attack. In this setting,
elections are defined with respect to voter groups rather than voters, which is a small dif-
ference from the traditional control setting. The voter groups model allows us to consider
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attacks on sets of voters, which is a more accurate model of realistic control scenarios.
In Yin et al. [56], the defense problem is modeled as a Stackelberg game in which limited
protection resources (say kd) are deployed to protect a collection of voter groups and the
adversary responds by attempting to subvert the election (by attacking, say, at most ka
groups). They consider the plurality voting rule, and show that the problem of choosing the
minimal set of resources that guarantee that an election cannot be controlled is NP-hard.
They further suggest a Mixed-Integer Program formulation that can usually be efficiently
tackled by solvers. Our main contribution is to study this problem in a parameterized setting
and provide a refined complexity landscape for it. We also introduce the complementary
attack problem, and extend the study to voting rules beyond plurality. We now turn to a
summary of our contributions.
Contribution:
We refer the reader to Section 2 for the relevant formal definitions, while focusing here on a
high-level overview of our results. Recall that the OPTIMAL DEFENSE problem asks for a set
of at most kd voter groups which, when protected, render any attack on at most ka voter
groups unsuccessful. In this paper, we study the parameterized complexity of OPTIMAL DE-
FENSE for all scoring rules and the Condorcet voting rule (these are natural choices because
they are computationally vulnerable to control - - the underlying “attack problem” can be
resolved in polynomial time). We show that the problem of finding an optimal defense is
tractable when both the attacker and the defender have limited resources. Specifically, we
show that the problem is fixed-parameter tractable with the combined parameter (ka, kd)
by a natural bounded-depth search tree approach. We also show that the OPTIMAL DEFENSE
problem is unlikely to admit a polynomial kernel under plausible complexity theoretic as-
sumption. We observe that both these parameters are needed for fixed parameter tractab-
ility, as we show W[2]-hardness when OPTIMAL DEFENSE is parameterized by either ka or
kd.
Another popular parameter considered for voting problems is m, the number of candidates
— as this is usually small compared to the size of the election in traditional application
scenarios. Unfortunately, we show that OPTIMAL DEFENSE is NP-hard even when the election
has only 3 candidates, eliminating the possibility of fixed-parameter algorithms (and even
XP algorithms). This strengthens a hardness result shown in Yin et al. [56]. Our hardness
results on a constant number of candidates rely on a succinct encoding of the information
about the scores of the candidates from each voter group. We also observe that the problem
is polynomially solvable when only two candidates are involved.
We introduce the complementary problem of attacking an election: here the attacker plays
her strategy first, and the defender is free to defend any of the attacked groups within the
budget. The attacker wins if she is successful in subverting the election no matter which
defense is played out. This problem turns out to be harder: it is already W[1]-hard when
parameterized by both ka and kd, which is in sharp contrast to the OPTIMAL DEFENSE prob-
lem. This problem is also hard in the setting of a constant number of candidates — specific-
ally, it is coNP-hard for the plurality voting rule [Theorem 10] and the Condorcet voting
rule [Theorem 12] even when we have only three candidates if every voter group is en-
coded as the number of plurality votes every candidate receives from that voter group. Our
demonstration of the hardness of the attack problem is another step in the program of using
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computational intractability as a barrier to undesirable phenomenon, which, in this context,
is the act of planning a systematic attack on voter groups with limited resources.
We finally propose two simple greedy algorithms for the OPTIMAL DEFENSE problem and
empirically show that it may be able to solve many instances of practical interest.
2 Preliminaries
Let C = {c1, c2, . . . , cm} be a set of candidates and V = {v1, v2, . . . , vn} a set of voters. If
not mentioned otherwise, we denote the set of candidates by C, the set of voters by V, the
number of candidates bym, and the number of voters by n. Every voter vi has a preference
or vote ≻i which is a complete order over C. We denote the set of all complete orders over
C by L(C). We call a tuple of n preferences (≻1,≻2, · · · ,≻n) ∈ L(C)
n an n-voter preference
profile. Often it is convenient to view a preference profile as a multi-set consisting of its
votes. The view we are taking will be clear from the context. A voting rule (often called
voting correspondence) is a function r : ∪n∈NL(C)
n −→ 2C \ {∅} which selects, from a
preference profile, a nonempty set of candidates as the winners. We refer the reader to [9]
for a comprehensive introduction to computational social choice. In this paper we will be
focusing on two voting rules – the scoring rules and the Condorcet voting rule which are
defined as follows.
Scoring Rule: A collection of m-dimensional vectors −→sm = (α1,α2, . . . ,αm) ∈ R
m with
α1 > α2 > . . . > αm and α1 > αm for every m ∈ N naturally defines a voting rule —
a candidate gets score αi from a vote if it is placed at the i
th position, and the score of
a candidate is the sum of the scores it receives from all the votes. The winners are the
candidates with the highest score. Given a set of candidates C, a score vector −→α of length
|C|, a candidate x ∈ C, and a profile P, we denote the score of x in P by s
−→α
P (x). When
the score vector −→α is clear from the context, we omit −→α from the superscript. A straight
forward observation is that the scoring rules remain unchanged if we multiply every αi by
any constant λ > 0 and/or add any constant µ. Hence, we assume without loss of generality
that for any score vector −→sm, there exists a j such that αj−αj+1 = 1 and αk = 0 for all k > j.
We call such a score vector a normalized score vector.
Weighted Majority Graph and Condorcet Voting Rule: Given an election E = (C, (≻1,≻2
, . . . ,≻n)) and two candidates x,y ∈ C, let us define NE(x,y) to be the number of votes
where the candidate x is preferred over y. We say that a candidate x defeats another can-
didate y in pairwise election if NE(x,y) > NE(y, x). Using the election E, we can construct
a weighted directed graph GE = (U = C,E) as follows. The vertex set U of the graph GE
is the set of candidates C. For any two candidates x,y ∈ C with x 6= y, let us define the
margin DE(x,y) of x from y to be NE(x,y)−NE(y, x). We have an edge from x to y in GE if
DE(x,y) > 0. Moreover, in that case, the weight w(x,y) of the edge from x to y is DE(x,y).
A candidate c is called the Condorcet winner of an election E if there is an edge from c to
every other vertices in the weighted majority graph GE. The Condorcet voting rule outputs
the Condorcet winner if it exists and outputs the set C of all candidates otherwise.
Let r be a voting rule. We study the r-OPTIMAL DEFENSE problem which was defined by
Yin et al. [56]. It is defined as follows. Intuitively, the r-OPTIMAL DEFENSE problem asks if
there is a way to defend kd voter groups such that, irrespective of which ka voter groups the
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attacker attacks, the output of the election (that is the winning set of candidates) is always
same as the original one. A voter group gets deleted if only if it is attacked but not defended.
◮ Definition 1 (r-OPTIMAL DEFENSE). Given n voter groups Gi, i ∈ [n], two integers ka and
kd, does there exist an index set I ⊆ [n] with |I| 6 kd such that, for every I
′ ⊂ [n] \ I with
|I′| 6 ka, we have r((Gi)i∈[n]\I′) = r((Gi)i∈[n])? The integers ka and kd are called respectively
attacker’s resource and defender’s resource. We denote an arbitrary instance of the r-OPTIMAL
DEFENSE problem by (C, {Gi : i ∈ [n]}, ka, kd).
We also study the r-OPTIMAL ATTACK problem which is defined as follows. Intuitively, in the
r-OPTIMAL ATTACK problem the attacker is interested to know if it is possible to attack ka
voter groups such that, no matter which kd voter groups the defender defends, the outcome
of the election is never same as the original (that is the attack is successful).
◮ Definition 2 (r-OPTIMAL ATTACK). Given n voter groups Gi, i ∈ [n], two integers ka and kd,
does there exist an index set I ⊆ [n] with |I| 6 ka such that, for every I
′ ⊆ [n] with |I′| 6 kd,
we have r((Gi)i∈[n]\(I\I′)) 6= r((Gi)i∈[n])? We denote an arbitrary instance of the r-OPTIMAL
ATTACK problem by (C, {Gi : i ∈ [n]}, ka, kd).
Encoding of the Input Instance: In both the r-OPTIMAL DEFENSE and r-OPTIMAL ATTACK
problems, we assume that every input voter group G is encoded as follows. The encoding
lists all the different votes ≻ that appear in the voter group G along with the number of
times the vote ≻ appear in G. Hence, if a voter group G contains only k different votes over
m candidates and consists of n voters, then the encoding of G takes O(km logm logn) bits
of memory.
Parameterized complexity: In parameterized complexity, each problem instance comes
with a parameter k. Formally, a parameterized problem Π is a subset of Γ∗ × N, where Γ is
a finite alphabet. An instance of a parameterized problem is a tuple (x, k), where k is the
parameter. A central notion is fixed parameter tractability (FPT) which means, for a given
instance (x, k), solvability in time f(k) · p(|x|), where f is an arbitrary function of k and p is
a polynomial in the input size |x|. Just as NP-hardness is used as evidence that a problem
probably is not polynomial time solvable, there exists a hierarchy of complexity classes above
FPT, and showing that a parameterized problem is hard for one of these classes is considered
evidence that the problem is unlikely to be fixed-parameter tractable. The main classes in
this hierarchy are: FPT ⊆ W[1] ⊆ W[2] ⊆ · · · ⊆ W[P] ⊆ XP. We now define the notion of
parameterized reduction [13].
◮ Definition 3. Let A,B be parameterized problems. We say that A is fpt-reducible to B if
there exist functions f,g : N → N, a constant α ∈ N and an algorithm Φ which transforms an
instance (x, k) of A into an instance (x ′,g(k)) of B in time f(k)|x|α so that (x, k) ∈ A if and
only if (x ′,g(k)) ∈ B.
To show W-hardness in the parameterized setting, it is enough to give a parameterized
reduction from a known hard problem. For a more detailed and formal introduction to
parameterized complexity, we refer the reader to [13] for a detailed introduction to this
paradigm.
◮Definition 4. [Kernelization] [50, 35] A kernelization algorithm for a parameterized prob-
lem Π ⊆ Γ∗ × N is an algorithm that, given (x, k) ∈ Γ∗ × N, outputs, in time polynomial in
|x| + k, a pair (x ′, k ′) ∈ Γ∗ × N such that (a) (x, k) ∈ Π if and only if (x ′, k ′) ∈ Π and (b)
|x ′|, k ′ 6 g(k), where g is some computable function. The output instance x ′ is called the kernel,
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and the function g is referred to as the size of the kernel. If g(k) = kO(1), then we say that Π
admits a polynomial kernel.
For many parameterized problems, it is well established that the existence of a polynomial
kernel would imply the collapse of the polynomial hierarchy to the third level (or more
precisely, CoNP ⊆ NP/Poly). Therefore, it is considered unlikely that these problems would
admit polynomial-sized kernels. For showing kernel lower bounds, we simply establish
reductions from these problems.
◮ Definition 5. [Polynomial Parameter Transformation] [8] Let Γ1 and Γ2 be paramet-
erized problems. We say that Γ1 is polynomial time and parameter reducible to Γ2, written
Γ1 6Ptp Γ2, if there exists a polynomial time computable function f : Σ
∗ × N → Σ∗ × N, and a
polynomial p : N→ N, and for all x ∈ Σ∗ and k ∈ N, if f ((x, k)) = (x ′, k ′), then (x, k) ∈ Γ1 if
and only if (x ′, k ′) ∈ Γ2, and k
′ 6 p (k). We call f a polynomial parameter transformation (or
a PPT) from Γ1 to Γ2.
This notion of a reduction is useful in showing kernel lower bounds because of the following
theorem.
◮ Theorem 6. [8, Theorem 3] Let P andQ be parameterized problems whose derived classical
problems are Pc,Qc, respectively. Let Pc be NP−complete, andQc ∈ NP. Suppose there exists
a PPT from P to Q. Then, if Q has a polynomial kernel, then P also has a polynomial kernel.
3 Classical Complexity Results
Yin et al. [56] showed that the OPTIMAL DEFENSE problem is polynomial time solvable for
the plurality voting rule when we have only 2 candidates. On the other hand, they also
showed that the OPTIMAL DEFENSE problem is NP-complete when we have an unbounded
number of candidates. We begin with improving their NP-completeness result by showing
that the OPTIMAL DEFENSE problem becomes NP-complete even when we have only 3 can-
didates and the attacker can attack any number of voter groups. Towards that, we reduce
the k-SUM problem to the OPTIMAL DEFENSE problem. The k-SUM problem is defined as
follows.
◮ Definition 7 (k-SUM). Given a set of n positive integers W = {wi, i ∈ [n]}, and two positive
integers k 6 n and M, does there exist an index set I ⊂ [n] with |I| = k such that
∑
i∈Iwi =
M?
The k-SUM problem can be easily proved to be NP-complete by modifying the NP-
completeness proof of the Subset Sum problem in Cormen et al. [12]. We also need the
following structural result for normalized scoring rules which has been used before [5, 19].
◮ Lemma 8. Let C = {c1, . . . , cm} be a set of candidates and
−→α a normalized score vector of
length |C|. Let x,y ∈ C, x 6= y, be any two arbitrary candidates. Then there exists a profile Pyx
consisting ofm votes such that we have the following.
sPyx (x) + 1 = sPyx (y) − 1 = sPyx (a) for every a ∈ C \ {x,y}
For any two candidates x,y ∈ C, x 6= y, we use Pyx to denote the profile as defined in
Theorem 8. We are now ready to present our NP-completeness result for the OPTIMAL
DEFENSE problem for the scoring rules even in the presence of 3 candidates only. In the
interest of space, we will provide only a sketch of a proof for a several results.
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◮ Theorem 9. The OPTIMAL DEFENSE problem is NP-complete for every scoring rule even if
the number of candidates is 3 and the attacker can attack any number of the voter groups.
Proof. The OPTIMAL DEFENSE problem for every scoring rule can be shown to belong to NP
by using a defense strategy S (a subset of at most kd voter groups) as a certificate. The fact
that the certificate can be validated in polynomial time involves checking if there exists a
successful attack despite protecting all groups in S. This can be done in polynomial time, but
due to space constraints, we defer a detailed argument to a full version of this manuscript.
We now turn to the reduction from k-SUM.
Let −→α be any normalized score vector of length 3. The OPTIMAL DEFENSE problem for
the scoring rule based on −→α belongs to NP. Let (W = {w1, . . . ,wn}, k,M) be an arbitrary
instance of the k-SUM problem. We can assume, without loss of generality, that 8 dividesM
and wi for every i ∈ [n]; if this is not the case, we replaceM and wi by respectively 8M and
8wi for every i ∈ [n] which clearly is an equivalent instance of the original instance. Let us
also assume, without loss of generality, that 2k < n (if not then add enough copies ofM+ 1
to W) and M <
∑n
i=1wi (since otherwise, it is a trivial NO instance). We construct the
following instance of the OPTIMAL DEFENSE problem for the scoring rule based on −→α . Let
M′ be an integer such thatM′ >
∑n
i=1wi and 8 dividesM
′. We have 3 candidates, namely
a, b, and c. We have the following voter groups.
– For every i ∈ [n], we have a voter group Gi consisting of wi copies of P
c
a (as defined in
Theorem 8) andM′ −wi copies of P
c
b. Hence, we have the following.
sGi(c) = sGi(a) +M
′ +wi = sGi(b) + 2M
′ −wi
– We have one voter group Gˆ consisting of (kM′+M)/2−3 copies of Pac , (kM
′−M)/2−1 copies
of Pbc , and (kM
′−M)/2 − 1 copies of Pba. We have the following.
s
Gˆ
(c) = s
Gˆ
(a) − (kM′ +M− 6) = s
Gˆ
(b) − (2kM′ −M− 6)
Let Q be the resulting profile; that is Q = ∪ni=1Gi ∪ Gˆ. We have sQ(c) = sQ(a) + (n− k)M
′ +∑n
i=1wi−M+6 = sQ(b)+(n−2k)M
′+M−
∑n
i=1wi+6. Since n > 2k andM
′ >
∑n
i=1wi,
we have sQ(c) > sQ(a) and sQ(c) > sQ(b). Thus the candidate c wins the election uniquely.
We define kd, the maximum number of voter groups that the defender can defend, to be
k. We define ka, the maximum number of voter groups that the attacker can attack, to be
n + 1. This finishes the description of the OPTIMAL DEFENSE instance. We claim that the
two instances are equivalent.
In the forward direction, let the k-SUM instance be a YES instance and I ⊂ [n] with |I| =
k be an index set such that
∑
i∈Iwi = M. Let us consider the defense strategy where
the defender protects the voter groups Gi for every i ∈ I. Since
∑
i∈Iwi = M, we have∑
i∈I(M
′−wi) = kM
′−M. LetH be the profile of voter groups corresponding to the index
set I; that is, H = ∪i∈IGi. Let H
′ be the profile remaining after the attacker attacks some
voter groups. Without loss of generality, we can assume that the attacker does not attack the
voter group Gˆ since otherwise the candidate c continues to win uniquely. We thus obviously
have H ∪ Gˆ ⊆ H′. We have s
H∪Gˆ
(c) = s
H∪Gˆ
(a) + kM′ +
∑
i∈Iwi − (kM
′ + M − 6) =
s
H∪Gˆ
(a) + 6 and s
H∪Gˆ
(c) = s
H∪Gˆ
(b) + 2kM′ −
∑
i∈Iwi − (2kM
′ −M− 6) = s
H∪Gˆ
(b) + 6.
Since the candidate c receives as much score as any other candidate in the voter group Gi
for every i ∈ [n], we have s
H′∪Gˆ
(c) > s
H′∪Gˆ
(a)+6 and s
H′∪Gˆ
(c) > s
H′∪Gˆ
(b)+6. Hence, the
candidate c wins uniquely in the resulting profileH′ after the attack and thus the defense is
successful.
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In the other direction, let the OPTIMAL DEFENSE instance be a YES instance. Without loss of
generality, we can assume that the attacker does not attack the voter group Gˆ and thus the
defender does not defend the voter group Gˆ. We can also assume, without loss of generality,
that the defender defends exactly k voter groups since the candidate c receives as much score
as any other candidate in the voter group Gi for every i ∈ [n]. Let I ⊂ [n] with |I| = k such
that defending all the voter groups Gi, i ∈ I is a successful defense strategy. We claim that∑
i∈Iwi > M. Suppose not, then let us assume that
∑
i∈Iwi < M. Since, wi is divisible
by 8 and positive for every i ∈ [n] and m is divisible by 8, we have
∑
i∈Iwi 6 M − 8. Let
H be the profile of voter groups corresponding to the index set I; that is, H = ∪i∈IGi. We
have s
H∪Gˆ
(c) = s
H∪Gˆ
(a)+ kM′+
∑
i∈Iwi−(kM
′+M− 6) 6 s
H∪Gˆ
(a)+M− 8−M+ 6 =
s
H∪Gˆ
(a) − 2. Hence attacking the voter groups Gi, i ∈ [n] \ I makes the score of c strictly
less than the score of a. This contradicts our assumption that defending all the voter groups
Gi, i ∈ I is a successful defense strategy. Hence we have
∑
i∈Iwi >M. We now claim that∑
i∈Iwi 6M. Suppose not, then let us assume that
∑
i∈Iwi > M. Since, wi is divisible by
8 and positive for every i ∈ [n] andm is divisible by 8, we have
∑
i∈Iwi >M+8. LetH
′ be
the profile of voter groups corresponding to the index set I; that is, H′ = ∪i∈IGi. We have
s
H′∪Gˆ
(c) = s
H′∪Gˆ
(b)+2kM′−
∑
i∈Iwi−(2kM
′−M−6) 6 s
H′∪Gˆ
(b)− (M+8)+M+6 =
s
H′∪Gˆ
(b) − 2. Hence attacking the voter groups Gi, i ∈ [n] \ I makes the score of c strictly
less than the score of b. This contradicts our assumption that defending all the voter groups
Gi, i ∈ I is a successful defense strategy. Hence we have
∑
i∈Iwi 6M. Therefore we have∑
i∈Iwi = M and thus the k-SUM instance is a YES instance. ◭
In the proof of Theorem 9, we observe that the reduced instance of the OPTIMAL DEFENSE
problem viewed as an instance of the OPTIMAL ATTACK problem is a NO instance if and
only if the k-SUM instance is a YES instance. Hence, the same reduction as in the proof of
Theorem 9 gives us the following result for the OPTIMAL ATTACK problem.
◮ Corollary 10. The OPTIMAL ATTACK problem is coNP-hard for every scoring rule even if the
number of candidates is 3 and the attacker can attack any number of voter groups.
We now prove a similar hardness result as of Theorem 9 for the Condorcet voting rule.
◮ Theorem 11. The OPTIMAL DEFENSE problem is NP-complete for the Condorcet voting rule
even if the number of candidates is 3 and the attacker can attack any number of voter groups.
Proof. The OPTIMAL DEFENSE problem for the Condorcet voting rule clearly belongs to
NP. To show NP-hardness, we reduce an arbitrary instance of the k-SUM problem to the
OPTIMAL DEFENSE problem for the Condorcet voting rule. Let ({w1, . . . ,wn}, k,M) be an
arbitrary instance of the k-SUM problem. We construct the following instance of the OPTIMAL
DEFENSE problem for the Condorcet voting rule. Let M′ = max{wi : i ∈ [n]}. We have 3
candidates, namely a, b, and c. We have the following voter groups.
– For every i ∈ [n], we have a voter group Gi where DGi(a,b) = 2wi,DGi(a, c) = 2(M
′ −
wi), and DGi(b, c) = 0.
– We have one voter group Gˆ where the candidates b and c receive respectivelyD
Gˆ
(b,a) =
2M− 1,D
Gˆ
(c,a) = 2(kM′ −M) − 1, and D
Gˆ
(b, c) = 1.
We define kd, the maximum number of voter groups that the defender can defend, to be
k. We define ka, the maximum number of voter groups that the attacker can attack, to
be n + 1. We observe that the candidate a is the Condorcet winner of the election. This
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finishes the description of the OPTIMAL DEFENSE instance. We claim that the two instances
are equivalent.
In the forward direction, let the k-SUM instance be a YES instance and I ⊂ [n] with |I| =
k be an index set such that
∑
i∈Iwi = M. Let us consider the defense strategy where
the defender protects the voter groups Gi for every i ∈ I. Since
∑
i∈Iwi = M, we have∑
i∈I(M
′ − wi) = kM
′ −M. Without loss of generality, we can assume that the attacker
does not attack the voter group Gˆ. We observe that the candidate a is the Condorcet winner
of the election even when the attacker attacks all the voter groups Gj, j ∈ [n] \ I. Hence the
OPTIMAL DEFENSE instance is a YES instance.
In the other direction, let the OPTIMAL DEFENSE instance be a YES instance. Without loss of
generality, we can assume that the attacker does not attack the voter group Gˆ and thus the
defender does not defend the voter group Gˆ. We can also assume, without loss of generality,
that the defender defends exactly k voter groups since the candidate a continues to be the
Condorcet winner if the attacker attacks at most k − 1 voter groups. Let I ⊂ [n] with
|I| = k such that defending all the voter groups Gi, i ∈ I is a successful defense strategy.
We claim that
∑
i∈Iwi > M. Suppose not, then let us assume that
∑
i∈Iwi < M. Then
attacking the voter groups Gi, i ∈ [n] \ I makes the candidate b defeat the candidate a
in pairwise election. This contradicts or assumption that defending all the voter groups
Gi, i ∈ I is a successful defense strategy. Hence we have
∑
i∈Iwi > M. We now claim that∑
i∈Iwi 6 M. Suppose not, then let us assume that
∑
i∈Iwi > M. Then attacking the
voter groups Gi, i ∈ [n]\ Imakes the candidate c defeat the candidate a in pairwise election.
This contradicts or assumption that defending all the voter groups Gi, i ∈ I is a successful
defense strategy. Hence we have
∑
i∈Iwi 6M. Therefore we have
∑
i∈Iwi = M and thus
the k-SUM instance is a YES instance. ◭
In the proof of Theorem 11, we observe that the reduced instance of OPTIMAL DEFENSE
viewed as an instance of the OPTIMAL ATTACK problem is a NO instance if and only if the
k-SUM instance is a YES instance. Hence, the same reduction as in the proof of Theorem 11
gives us the following result for the OPTIMAL ATTACK problem.
◮ Corollary 12. The OPTIMAL ATTACK problem is coNP-hard for the Condorcet voting rule
even if the number of candidates is 3 and the attacker can attack any number of voter groups.
4 W-Hardness Results
In this section, we present our hardness results for the OPTIMAL DEFENSE and the OPTIMAL
ATTACK problems in the parameterized complexity framework. We consider the following
parameters for both the problems – number of candidate (m), defender’s resource (kd), and
attacker’s resource (ka). From Theorems 9 to 12 we immediately have the following result
for the OPTIMAL DEFENSE and OPTIMAL ATTACK problems parameterized by the number of
candidates for both the scoring rules and the Condorcet voting rule.
◮ Corollary 13. The OPTIMAL DEFENSE problem is para-NP-hard parameterized by the num-
ber of candidates for both the scoring rules and the Condorcet voting rule. The OPTIMAL ATTACK
problem is para-coNP-hard parameterized by the number of candidates for both the scoring
rules and the Condorcet voting rule.
10 A Parameterized Perspective on Protecting Elections
The NP-completeness proof for the OPTIMAL DEFENSE problem for the plurality voting rule
by Yin et al. [56] is actually a parameter preserving reduction from the HITTING SET problem
parameterized by the solution size. The HITTING SET problem is defined as follows.
◮ Definition 14 (HITTING SET). Given a universe U, a set S = {Si : i ∈ [t]} of subsets of U,
and a positive integer k which is at most |U|, does there exist a subsetW ⊆ U with |W| = k such
that W ∩ Si 6= ∅ for every i ∈ [t]. We denote an arbitrary instance of HITTING SET by (U, S, k).
Since the HITTING SET problem parameterized by the solution size k is known to be W[2]-
complete [23], the following result immediately follows from Theorem 2 of Yin et al. [56].
⊲ Observation 1 ([56]). The OPTIMAL DEFENSE problem for the plurality voting rule is
W[2]-hard parameterized by kd.
We now generalize Observation 1 to any scoring rule by exhibiting a polynomial parameter
transform from the HITTING SET problem parameterized by the solution size.
◮ Theorem 15. The OPTIMAL DEFENSE problem for every scoring rule is W[2]-hard paramet-
erized by kd.
Proof. Let (U, S = {Sj : j ∈ [t]}, k) be an arbitrary instance of HITTING SET. Let U = {zi : i ∈
[n]}. Without loss of generality, we assume that Sj 6= ∅ for every j ∈ [t] since otherwise the
instance is a NO instance. Let −→α be a normalized score vector of length t+ 2. We construct
the following instance of the OPTIMAL DEFENSE problem for the scoring rule based on −→α .
The set of candidates C = {xj : j ∈ [t]} ∪ {y,d}. We have the following voter groups.
– For every i ∈ [n], we have a voter group Gi. For every j ∈ [t] with zi ∈ Sj we have 2
copies of Pdxj in Gi.
– We have one group Gˆ where we have 2tn copies of P
xj
d for every j ∈ [n] and 2tn − 1
copies of P
y
d.
Let Q be the resulting profile; that is Q = ∪ni=1Gi ∪ Gˆ. We define the defender’s resource
kd to be k + 1 and attacker’s resource to be n. This finishes the description of the OPTIMAL
DEFENSE instance. Since Sj 6= ∅ for every j ∈ [t], we have sQ(y) > sQ(xj) for every j ∈ [t].
We also have sQ(y) > sQ(d). Hence the candidate y is the unique winner of the profile Q. We
now prove that the OPTIMAL DEFENSE instance (C,Q, ka, kd) is equivalent to the HITTING
SET instance (U, S, k).
In the forward direction, let us suppose that the HITTING SET instance is a YES instance. Let
I ⊂ [n] be such that |I| = k and {zi : i ∈ I} ∩ Sj 6= ∅. We claim that the defender’s strategy of
defending the voter groups Gj for every j ∈ [t]\I and Gˆ results in a successful defense. LetH
be the profile of voter groups corresponding to the index set I; that is,H = ∪i∈IGi. LetH
′ be
the profile remaining after the attacker attacks some voter groups. We thus obviously have
H ∪ Gˆ ⊆ H′. Since {zi : i ∈ I} forms a hitting set, we have sH′(y) > sH′(xj) for every j ∈ [t].
Also since the voter group Gˆ is defended, we have sH′(y) > sH′(d). Hence the candidate y
continues to win uniquely even after the attack and hence the OPTIMAL DEFENSE instance is
a YES instance.
In the other direction, let the OPTIMAL DEFENSE instance be a YES instance. Without loss
of generality, we can assume that the defender defends the voter group Gˆ since otherwise
the attacker can attack the voter group Gˆ which makes the score of the candidate d more
than the score of the candidate y and thus defense would fail. We can also assume, without
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loss of generality, that the defender defends exactly k voter groups. Let I ⊂ [n] with |I| = k
such that defending all the voter groups Gi, i ∈ I and Gˆ is a successful defense strategy.
Let us consider Z = {zi : i ∈ I} ⊆ U. We claim that Z must form a hitting set. Indeed,
otherwise let us assume that there exists a j ∈ [t] such that Z ∩ Sj = ∅. Consider the
situation where the attacker attacks voter groups Gi for every i ∈ [n] \ I. We observe that
s
∪i∈IGi∪Gˆ
(xj) > s∪i∈IGi∪Gˆ(y). This contradicts our assumption that defending all the voter
groups Gi, i ∈ I and Gˆ is a successful defense strategy. Hence Z forms a hitting set and thus
the HITTING SET instance is a YES instance. ◭
In the proof of Theorem 15, we observe that the reduced instance of OPTIMAL DEFENSE
viewed as an instance of the OPTIMAL ATTACK problem is a NO instance if and only if the
k-SUM instance is a YES instance. Hence, the same reduction as in the proof of Theorem 15
gives us the following result for the OPTIMAL ATTACK problem.
◮ Corollary 16. The OPTIMAL ATTACK problem for every scoring rule is W[2]-hard parameter-
ized by kd.
We now show W[2]-hardness of the OPTIMAL DEFENSE problem for the Condorcet voting
rule parameterized by kd. Towards that, we need the following lemma which has been used
before [46, 55].
◮ Lemma 17. For any function f : C× C −→ Z, such that
1. ∀a,b ∈ C, f(a,b) = −f(b,a).
2. ∀a,b, c,d ∈ C, f(a,b) + f(c,d) is even,
there exists a n voters’ profile such that for all a,b ∈ C, a defeats b with a margin of f(a,b).
Moreover,
n is even and n = O

 ∑
{a,b}∈C×C
|f(a,b)|


Next, we show the W[2]-hardness of the OPTIMAL DEFENSE problem for the Condorcet voting
rule parameterized by kd. This is also a parameter-preserving reduction from the HITTING
SET problem.
◮ Theorem 18. The OPTIMAL DEFENSE problem for the Condorcet voting rule is W[2]-hard
parameterized by kd.
Proof. Let (U, S = {Sj : j ∈ [t]}, k) be an arbitrary instance of HITTING SET. Let U = {zi :
i ∈ [n]}. Without loss of generality, we assume that Sj 6= ∅ for every j ∈ [t] since otherwise
the instance is a NO instance. We construct the following instance of the OPTIMAL DEFENSE
problem for the Condorcet voting rule. The set of candidates C = {xj : j ∈ [t]}∪ {y}. For every
i ∈ [n], we have a voter group Gi. For every j ∈ [t] with zi ∈ Sj we have DGi(y, xj) = 2.
Let Q be the resulting profile; that is Q = ∪ni=1Gi. We define the defender’s resource kd to
be k and attacker’s resource to be n. This finishes the description of the OPTIMAL DEFENSE
instance. Since Sj 6= ∅ for every j ∈ [t], we have DQ(y, xj) > 2 for every j ∈ [t]. Hence
the candidate y is the Condorcet winner of the profile Q. We now prove that the OPTIMAL
DEFENSE instance (C,Q, ka, kd) is equivalent to the HITTING SET instance (U, S, k).
In the forward direction, let us suppose that the HITTING SET instance is a YES instance. Let
I ⊂ [n] be such that |I| = k and {zi : i ∈ I} ∩ Sj 6= ∅. We claim that the defender’s strategy
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of defending the voter groups Gj for every j ∈ [t] \ I results in a successful defense. Let H
be the profile of voter groups corresponding to the index set I; that is, H = ∪i∈IGi. Let
H′ be the profile remaining after the attacker attacks some voter groups. We thus obviously
have H ⊆ H′. Since {zi : i ∈ I} forms a hitting set, we have DH′(y, xj) > 2 for every
j ∈ [t]. Hence the candidate y continues to win uniquely even after the attack and hence the
OPTIMAL DEFENSE instance is a YES instance.
In the other direction, let the OPTIMAL DEFENSE instance be a YES instance. We can also
assume, without loss of generality, that the defender defends exactly k voter groups. Let
I ⊂ [n] with |I| = k such that defending all the voter groups Gi, i ∈ I is a successful defense
strategy. Let us consider Z = {zi : i ∈ I} ⊆ U. We claim that Z must form a hitting set.
Indeed, otherwise let us assume that there exists a j ∈ [t] such that Z∩ Sj = ∅. Consider the
situation where the attacker attacks voter groups Gi for every i ∈ [n] \ I. We observe that
D∪i∈IGi(y, xj) = 0 and hence the candidate y is not the Condorcet winner. This contradicts
our assumption that defending all the voter groups Gi, i ∈ I is a successful defense strategy.
Hence Z forms a hitting set and thus the HITTING SET instance is a YES instance. ◭
In the proof of Theorem 18, we observe that the reduced instance of OPTIMAL DEFENSE
viewed as an instance of the OPTIMAL ATTACK problem is a NO instance if and only if the
k-SUM instance is a YES instance. Hence, the same reduction as in the proof of Theorem 18
gives us the following result for the OPTIMAL ATTACK problem.
◮ Corollary 19. The OPTIMAL ATTACK problem for the Condorcet voting rule is W[2]-hard
parameterized by kd.
We now show that the OPTIMAL DEFENSE problem for scoring rules is W[2]-hard paramet-
erized by ka also by exhibiting a parameter preserving reduction from a problem closely
related to HITTING SET, which is SET COVER problem parameterized by the solution size.
The SET COVER problem is defined as follows. This is a W[2]-complete problem [23]. We
now present our W[2]-hardness proof for the OPTIMAL DEFENSE problem for scoring rules
parameterized by ka, by a reduction from SET COVER.
◮ Definition 20 (SET COVER). Given an universe U, a set S = {Si : i ∈ [t]} of subsets of U, and
a non-negative integer k which is at most t, does there exists an index set I ⊂ [t] with |I| = k
such that
⋃
i∈I Si = U. We denote an arbitrary instance of SET COVER by (U, S, k).
◮ Theorem 21. The OPTIMAL DEFENSE problem for every scoring rule and Condorcet rule is
W[2]-hard parameterized by ka.
◮ Theorem 22. The OPTIMAL DEFENSE problem for every scoring rule is W[2]-hard paramet-
erized by ka.
Proof. Let (U, S = {Sj : j ∈ [t]}, k) be an arbitrary instance of SET COVER. Let U = {zi :
i ∈ [n]}. We assume that k > 3 since otherwise the SET COVER instance is polynomial
time solvable. For i ∈ [n], let fi be the number of j ∈ [t] such that zi ∈ Sj; that is, fi =
|{j ∈ [t] : zi ∈ Sj}|. We assume, without loss of generality, that for every i ∈ [n], t − fi −
k > 3k by adding at most 9t empty sets in S. We construct the following instance of the
OPTIMAL DEFENSE problem for the scoring rule induced by the score vector −→α rule. The set
of candidates C = {xi : i ∈ [n]}∪ {y,d}. Let
−→α be any normalized score vector of length n+2.
We have the following voter groups.
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– For every j ∈ [t], we have a voter group Gj. For every i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [t] with zi /∈ Sj, we
have 2 copies of Pdxi .
– We have another voter groupH where, for every i ∈ [n], we have 2tn+(2(t−fi−k)+1)
copies of Pxid and 2tn copies of P
y
d.
We define attacker resource ka to be k and the defender’s resource kd to be t − k. This
finishes the description of the OPTIMAL DEFENSE instance. We first observe that the score
of the candidate d is strictly less than the score of every other candidate. We now observe
that the candidate y is the unique winner of the election since the score of the candidate y
is 2k − 1 more than the score of the candidate xi for every i ∈ [n]. We now prove that the
OPTIMAL DEFENSE instance (C,∪j∈[t]Gj ∪H, ka, kd) is equivalent to the SET COVER instance
(U, S, k).
In the forward direction, let us suppose that the SET COVER instance is a YES instance. Let
I ⊂ [t] be such that |I| = k and
⋃
j∈I Sj = U. We claim that the defender’s strategy of
defending the voter groups Gj for every j ∈ [t] \ I results in a successful defense. To see
this, we first observe that, if the attacker attacks the voter group H, then the candidate y
continues to uniquely win the election irrespective of what other voter groups the attacker
attacks. Indeed, since t−fi−k > 3k for every i ∈ [n], the score of the candidate xi is strictly
less than the score of the candidate y irrespective of what other voter groups the attacker
attacks. Since, for every i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [t], the score of the candidate xi is not more than
the score of the candidate y in the voter group Gj, we may assume that the attacker attacks
the voter group Gj for every j ∈ I (since they are the only voter groups unprotected except
H). Now, since Sj, j ∈ I forms a set cover of U, after deleting the voter groups Gj, j ∈ I, the
score of the candidate xi increases by at most 2(k − 1) from the original election for every
i ∈ [n]. Hence, after deleting the voter groups Gj, j ∈ I, the score of the candidate xi is still
strictly less than the score of the candidate y. Hence the candidate y continues to win and
thus the defense is successful. Hence the OPTIMAL DEFENSE instance is a YES instance.
In the other direction, let us suppose that the OPTIMAL DEFENSE instance is a YES instance.
We assume, without loss of generality, that the defender protects exactly t− k voter groups.
We argued in the forward direction that we can assume, without loss of generality, that
the attacker never attacks the voter group H. Hence, we can also assume, without loss of
generality, that the defender also does not defend the voter group H. Let I ⊂ [t] be such
that |I| = k and the defender defends the voter group Gj for every j ∈ [t] \ I. We claim
that the sets Sj, j ∈ I forms a set cover of U. Suppose not, then let zi be an element in U
which is not covered by Sj, j ∈ I. We observe that attacking the voter groups Gj for every
j ∈ I increases the score of the candidate xi by 2k which makes the candidate y lose in the
resulting election (after deleting the voter groups Gj for every j ∈ I) since the score of xi is
strictly more than the score of y. This contradicts our assumption that defending the voter
group Gj for every j ∈ [t]\ I is a successful defense strategy. Hence Sj, j ∈ I forms a set cover
of U and thus the SET COVER instance is a YES instance. ◭
We now present our W[2]-hardness proof for the OPTIMAL DEFENSE problem for the Con-
dorcet voting rule parameterized by ka.
◮ Theorem 23. The OPTIMAL DEFENSE problem for the Condorcet voting rule is W[2]-hard
parameterized by ka.
Proof. Let (U, S = {Sj : j ∈ [t]}, k) be an arbitrary instance of SET COVER. Let U = {zi :
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i ∈ [n]}. We assume that k > 3 since otherwise the SET COVER instance is polynomial time
solvable. For i ∈ [n], let fi be the number of j ∈ [t] such that zi ∈ Sj; that is, fi = |{j ∈
[t] : zi ∈ Sj}|. We assume, without loss of generality, that for every i ∈ [n], t − fi − k > 3k
by adding at most 9t empty sets in S. We construct the following instance of the OPTIMAL
DEFENSE problem for the Condorcet voting rule. The set of candidates C = {xi : i ∈ [n]}∪ {y}.
We have the following voter groups.
– For every j ∈ [t], we have a voter group Gj. For every i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [t], we have
DGj(y, xi) = 2 if zi /∈ Sj and DGj(y, xi) = 0 otherwise. We also have DGj(xi, xℓ) = 0 for
every j ∈ [t], i, ℓ ∈ [n] with i 6= ℓ.
– We have another voter groupH where, for every i ∈ [n], we have DH(xi,y) = 2(t− fi−
k). We also have DH(xi, xℓ) = 0 for every i, ℓ ∈ [n] with i 6= ℓ.
We define attacker resource ka to be k and the defender’s resource kd to be t − k. This fin-
ishes the description of the OPTIMAL DEFENSE instance. We first observe that the candidate
y is a Condorcet winner of the resulting election. We now prove that the OPTIMAL DEFENSE
instance (C,∪j∈[t]Gj ∪H, ka, kd) is equivalent to the SET COVER instance (U, S, k).
In the forward direction, let us suppose that the SET COVER is a YES instance. Let I ⊂ [t]
be such that |I| = k and
⋃
j∈I Sj = U. We claim that the defender’s strategy of defending
the voter groups Gj for every j ∈ [t] \ I results in a successful defense. To see this, we first
observe that, we can assume without loss of generality that the attacker does not attack the
voter group H since the candidate y loses every pairwise election in H. Since, for every
i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [t], the candidate y does not lose any pairwise election in the voter group
Gj, we may assume that the attacker attacks the voter group Gj for every j ∈ I (since they
are the only voter groups unprotected except H). Now, since Sj, j ∈ I forms a set cover of
U, after deleting the voter groups Gj, j ∈ I, we have D∪j∈[t]\IGi∪H(y, xi) > 2(t − fi − k +
1) − 2(t − fi − k) = 2 for every i ∈ [n]. Hence, after deleting the voter groups Gj, j ∈ I,
the candidate y continues to be the Condorcet winner of the remaining profile. Hence the
OPTIMAL DEFENSE instance is a YES instance.
In the other direction, let us suppose that the OPTIMAL DEFENSE instance is a YES instance.
We assume, without loss of generality, that the defender protects exactly t− k voter groups.
We argued in the forward direction that we can assume, without loss of generality, that
the attacker never attacks the voter group H. Hence, we can also assume, without loss of
generality, that the defender also does not defend the voter groupH. Let I ⊂ [t] be such that
|I| = k and the defender defends the voter group Gj for every j ∈ [t] \ I. We claim that the
sets Sj, j ∈ I forms a set cover of U. Suppose not, then let zi be an element in U which is not
covered by Sj, j ∈ I. We observe thatD∪j∈[t]\IGi∪H(y, xi) = 2(t−fi−k)−2(t−fi−k) = 0 and
thus attacking the voter groups Gj for every j ∈ I makes the candidate y not the Condorcet
winner. This contradicts our assumption that defending the voter group Gj for every j ∈ [t]\I
is a successful defense strategy. Hence Sj, j ∈ I forms a set cover ofU and thus the SET COVER
instance is a YES instance. ◭
We now show that the OPTIMAL ATTACK problem for the scoring rules is W[1]-hard even
parameterized by the combined parameter ka and kd. Towards that, we exhibit a polyno-
mial parameter transform from the CLIQUE problem parameterized by the size of the clique
we are looking for which is known to be W[1]-complete. The CLIQUE problem is defined as
follows.
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◮ Definition 24 (CLIQUE). Given a graph G and an integer k, does there exist a clique in G of
size k? We denote an arbitrary instance of CLIQUE by (G, k).
◮ Theorem 25. The OPTIMAL ATTACK problem for every scoring rule is W[1]-hard parameter-
ized by (ka, kd).
Proof. Let (G = (V,E), k) be an arbitrary instance of the CLIQUE problem. Let V = {vi :
i ∈ [n]} and E = {ej : j ∈ [m]}. Let
−→α be any arbitrary normalized score vector of length
m+ 2. We construct the following instance of the OPTIMAL ATTACK problem for the scoring
rule induced by the score vector −→α . The set of candidates C = {xj : j ∈ [m]}∪ {y,d}. We have
the following voter groups.
– For every i ∈ [n], we have a voter group Gi. For every i ∈ [n], we have 10m copies of P
x
d
for every x ∈ C \ {d} in Gi. We also have two copies of P
d
xj
in the voter group Gi if the
edge ej is incident on the vertex vi, for every i ∈ [m] and j ∈ [m].
– We have another voter group H. We have one copy of P
xj
d for every j ∈ [m] in H.
We define attacker resource ka to be k and the defender’s resource kd to be k − 2. This
finishes the description of the OPTIMAL ATTACK instance. Let Q be the resulting profile; that
it Q = ∪i∈[n]Gi ∪ H. We first observe that the candidate y is the winner of the resulting
election since sQ(y) = sQ(xj) + 3 and sQ(y) > sQ(d). This completes a description of the
construction. Due to lack of space, we defer the proof of equivalence to a longer version of
this manuscript. We now prove that the OPTIMAL ATTACK instance (C,Q, ka, kd) is equivalent
to the CLIQUE instance (G, k).
In the forward direction, let us assume that U = {vi : i ∈ I} ⊂ V with |I| = k forms a clique
in G. We claim that attacking all the voter groups Gi, i ∈ I forms a successful attack. Indeed,
suppose the defender defends all the voter groups Gi, i ∈ I except Gℓ and Gℓ′ . Let ej⋆ be
the edge between the vertices vℓ and vℓ′ in G. Let the profile after the attack be Gˆ; that is,
Gˆ = ∪i∈[n]\IGi ∪ Gℓ ∪ Gℓ′ ∪H. Then we have sGˆ(y) = sGˆ(xj⋆) − 1 and thus the candidate y
does not win after the attack. Hence the OPTIMAL ATTACK instance is YES instance.
In the other direction, let the OPTIMAL ATTACK instance be a YES instance. We first observe
that the candidate d performs worse than everyone else in every voter group and thus d can
never win. Now we can assume, without loss of generality, that the attacker does not attack
the voter groupH since the candidate y is not receiving more score than any other candidate
except d in H. Let attacking all the voter groups Gi, i ∈ I with |I| 6 k is a successful attack.
We observe that if |I| < k, then defending any k− 2 of the groups that are attacked foils the
attack – since the candidate y continues to win even after deleting any one group. Hence we
have |I| = k. Let us consider the subset of vertices U = {vi : i ∈ I}. We claim that U forms a
clique in G. Indeed, if not, then let us assume that there exists two indices ℓ, ℓ′ ∈ I such that
there is no edge between the vertices vℓ and vℓ′ in G. Let us consider the defender strategy
of defending all the voter groups Gi, i ∈ I \ {ℓ, ℓ
′}. We observe that the candidate y continues
to uniquely receive the highest score among all the candidates and thus y wins uniquely in
the resulting election. This contradicts our assumption that attacking all the voter groups
Gi, i ∈ I with |I| 6 k is a successful attack. Hence U forms a clique in G and thus the CLIQUE
instance is a YES instance. ◭
We now show similar result as of Theorem 25 for the Condorcet voting rule.
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◮ Theorem 26. The OPTIMAL ATTACK problem for the Condorcet voting rule is W[1]-hard
parameterized by (ka, kd).
Proof. Let (G = (V,E), k) be an arbitrary instance of the CLIQUE problem. Let V = {vi :
i ∈ [n]} and E = {ej : j ∈ [m]}. We construct the following instance of the OPTIMAL ATTACK
problem for the Condorcet voting rule. The set of candidates C = {xj : j ∈ [m]} ∪ {y}. We
have the following voter groups.
– For every i ∈ [n], we have a voter group Gi. We have DGi(y, xj) = 2 if the edge ej is
incident on the vertex vi and DGi(y, xj) = 0 if the edge ej is not incident on the vertex
vi, for every i ∈ [n] and j ∈ [m]. We also have DGi(xℓ, xj) = 0 for every i ∈ [n], j, ℓ ∈ [m],
and j 6= ℓ.
– We have another voter group H where we have DH(xj,y) = 2 for every j ∈ [m] and
DH(xℓ, xj) = 0 for every j, ℓ ∈ [m] and j 6= ℓ.
We define attacker resource ka to be k and the defender’s resource kd to be k − 2. This
finishes the description of the OPTIMAL ATTACK instance. Let Q be the resulting profile;
that it Q = ∪i∈[n]Gi ∪ H. We first observe that the candidate y is the Condorcet winner
of the resulting election. We now prove that the OPTIMAL ATTACK instance (C,Q, ka, kd) is
equivalent to the CLIQUE instance (G, k).
In the forward direction, let us assume that U = {vi : i ∈ I} ⊂ V with |I| = k forms a clique
in G. We claim that attacking all the voter groups Gi, i ∈ I forms a successful attack. Indeed,
suppose the defender defends all the voter groups Gi, i ∈ I except Gℓ and Gℓ′ . Let ej⋆ be
the edge between the vertices vℓ and vℓ′ in G. Let the profile after the attack be Gˆ; that is,
Gˆ = ∪i∈[n]\IGi ∪ Gℓ ∪ Gℓ′ ∪H. Then we have DGˆ(y, xj⋆) = 0 and thus the candidate y is not
the unique winner after the attack. Hence the OPTIMAL ATTACK instance is YES instance.
In the other direction, let the OPTIMAL ATTACK instance be a YES instance. We can assume,
without loss of generality, that the attacker does not attack the voter group H since the
candidate y loses every pairwise election in H. Let attacking all the voter groups Gi, i ∈ I
with |I| 6 k is a successful attack. We observe that if |I| < k, then defending any k − 2
of the groups that are attacked foils the attack – since the candidate y continues to be the
Condorcet winner even after deleting any one group. Hence we have |I| = k. Let us consider
the subset of vertices U = {vi : i ∈ I}. We claim that U forms a clique in G. Indeed, if not,
then let us assume that there exists two indices ℓ, ℓ′ ∈ I such that there is no edge between
the vertices vℓ and vℓ′ in G. Let us consider the defender strategy of defending all the voter
groups Gi, i ∈ I \ {ℓ, ℓ
′}. We observe that the candidate y continues to be the Condorcet
winner in the resulting election. This contradicts our assumption that attacking all the voter
groups Gi, i ∈ I with |I| 6 k is a successful attack. Hence U forms a clique in G and thus the
CLIQUE instance is a YES instance. ◭
Once we have a parameterized algorithm for the OPTIMAL DEFENSE problem for the para-
meter (ka, kd), an immediate question is whether there exists a kernel for the OPTIMAL
DEFENSE problem of size polynomial in (ka, kd). We know that the HITTING SET problem
does not admit polynomial kernel parameterized by the universe size [23]. We observe that
the reductions from the HITTING SET problem to the OPTIMAL DEFENSE problem in The-
orem 15 and ?? are polynomial parameter transformations. Hence we immediately have the
following corollary.
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◮ Corollary 27. The OPTIMAL DEFENSE and OPTIMAL ATTACK problems for the scoring rules
and the Condorcet rule do not admit a polynomial kernel parameterized by (ka, kd).
5 The FPT Algorithm
We complement the negative results of Observation 1 and Theorem 22 by presenting an FPT
algorithm for the OPTIMAL DEFENSE problem parameterized by (ka, kd). In the absence of
a defender, that is when kd = 0, Yin et al. [56] showed that the OPTIMAL DEFENSE problem
is polynomial time solvable for the plurality voting rule. Their polynomial time algorithm
for the OPTIMAL DEFENSE problem can easily be extended to any scoring rule. Using this
polynomial time algorithm, we design the following O∗(kkda ) time algorithm for the OPTIMAL
DEFENSE problem for scoring rules. This result shows that the OPTIMAL DEFENSE problem
is fixed parameter tractable with (ka, kd) as the parameter.
◮ Theorem 28. There is an algorithm for the OPTIMAL DEFENSE problem for every scoring
rule and the Condorcet voting rule which runs in time O∗(kkda ).
Proof. Let us prove the result for any scoring rule. The proof for the Condorcet voting rule
is exactly similar. Initially we run the attacking algorithm over the n voter groups without
any group being protected. If a successful attack exists, the algorithm outputs the ka groups
to be deleted. We recursively branch on ka cases by protecting one of these ka groups in
each branch and running the attacking algorithm again. In addition, the parameter kd is
also reduced by 1 each time a group is protected. When kd=0, the attacking algorithm is
run on all the leaves of the tree and a valid protection strategy exists as long as for at least
one of the leaves the attack outputs no i.e. after deploying resources to protect kd groups
the attacker is unable to change the outcome of the election with any strategy. The groups
to be protected is determined by traversing the tree that leads to the particular leaf which
did not output an attack. Clearly the number of nodes in this tree is bounded by kkda . The
amount of time taken to find an attack at each node is bounded by poly(n). Hence the
running time of this algorithm is bounded by kkda .poly(n). ◭
6 Experiments
Though the previous sections show that the optimal defending problem is computationally
intractable, it is a worst-case result. In practice, elections have voting profiles that are
generated from some (possibly known) distribution. In this section, we conduct an empirical
study to understand how simple defending strategies perform for two such statistical voter
generation models. The defending strategies we consider are variants of a simple greedy
policy.
Defending strategy: For a given voting profile and a voting rule, the defending strategy finds
the winner. Suppose the winner is a. The strategy considers a with every other candidate,
and for each such pair it creates a sorted list of classes based on the winning margin of
votes for a in those classes, and picks the top kd classes to form a sub-list. Now, among
all these (m − 1) sorted sub-lists, the strategy picks the most frequent kd classes to protect.
We call this version of the strategy GREEDY 1. For certain profiles an optimal attacker (a)
may change the outcome by attacking some of the unprotected classes or (b) is unable to
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Figure 1 Performances of GREEDY 1 and GREEDY 2 for uniform voting profile generation model.
change the outcome. If (a) occurs, then there is a possibility that for the value of kd there
does not exist any defense strategy which can guard the election from all possible strategies
of the attacker. In that case, GREEDY 1 is optimal and is not optimal otherwise. It is always
optimal for case (b). Note that, given a profile and kd protected classes, it is easy to find
if there exists an optimal attack strategy, while it is not so easy to identify whether there
does not exist any defending strategy if the GREEDY 1 fails to defend. We find the latter
with a brute-force search for this experiment. A small variant of GREEDY 1 is the following:
when GREEDY 1 is unable to defend (which is possible to find out in poly-time), the strategy
chooses to protect kd classes uniformly at random. Call this strategy GREEDY 2.
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Figure 2 Performances of GREEDY 1 and GREEDY 2 for voting profile generation model with two
major contesting candidates.
Voting profile generation: Fix m = 5. We generate 1000 preference profiles over these
alternatives for n = 12000, where each vote is picked uniformly at random from the set of
all possible strict preference orders over m alternatives. The voters are partitioned into 12
classes containing equal number of voters. We consider three voting rules: plurality, veto,
and Borda. The lower plot in Figure 1 shows the number of profiles which belongs to the
three categories: (i) GREEDY 1 defends (is optimal), (ii) GREEDY 1 cannot defend but no
defending strategy exists (is optimal), (iii) GREEDY 1 cannot defend but defending strategy
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exists (not optimal). The x-axis shows different values of kd and we fix ka = 12 − kd.
The upper plot of Figure 1 shows the fraction of the profiles successfully defended by GREEDY
2 where GREEDY 1 is not optimal (i.e., cannot defend but defending strategy exists) when
GREEDY 2 uniformly at random picks kd classes 100 times. These fractions therefore serves
as an empirical probability of successful defense of GREEDY 2 given GREEDY 1 is not optimal.
In an election where the primary contest happens between two major candidates, even
though there are more candidates present, the generation model may be a little different.
We also consider another generation model that generates 40% profiles having a fixed al-
ternative a on top and the strict order of the (m − 1) alternatives is picked uniformly at
random, a similar 40% profiles with some other alternative b on top, and the remaining
20% preferences are picked uniformly at random from the set of all possible strict prefer-
ence orders. Similar experiments are run on this generation model and results are shown in
Figure 2.
The results show that even though optimal defense is a hard problem, a simple strategy
like greedy achieves more than 70% optimality. From the rest 30% non-optimal cases, the
variant GREEDY 2 is capable of salvaging it into optimal with probability almost 5% for
uniform generation model and above 5% for two-major contestant generation model for
kd = ka = 6. This empirically hints at a possibility that defending real elections may not be
too difficult.
7 Conclusion
We have considered the OPTIMAL DEFENSE problem from a primarily parameterized per-
spective for scoring rules and the Condorcet voting rule. We showed hardness in the number
of candidates, the number of resources for the defender or the attacker. On the other hand,
we show tractability for the combined parameter (ka, kd). We also introduced the OPTIMAL
ATTACK problem, which is hard even for the combined parameter (ka, kd), and also showed
the hardness for a constant number of candidates. Even though the OPTIMAL DEFENSE prob-
lem is hard, empirically we show that relatively simple mechanisms ensure good defending
performance for reasonable voting profiles.
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